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Summary 
From its founding in 1949 until the death of Chairman Mao in 1976, communist China 
was relatively isolated from global economic flows. Or rather, to be more precise, the 
coutry did not have strong economic ties with the West, though it was an active geopoliti-
cal force (e.g. intervening in the Korean War, developing a nuclear program, the Taiwan 
Strait Crises, the schism with Soviets, Ping Pong Diplomacy, etc.). The death of the great 
leader marked a significant watershed in China’s history as Mao’s successor, Deng Xiao-
ping, initiated a program of economic reforms called ‘Socialism with Chinese characteris-
tics’. China has since become a communist-run country that operates a full-fledged mar-
ket economy. This program opened up the Chinese economy and, to a lesser extent, 
society, to the world. Ever since, China has not ceased to grow. Today, the country is the 
second largest economy in the world, just behind the U.S. 
One of the most significant indicators of rapid industrialization and economic devel-
opment in China is that of domestic energy consumption. In the last two decades, China 
doubled its energy needs, and domestic industry and consumers are demanding more 
energy to grow and develop from year to year. In 2011, China became the second largest 
automobile purchaser on the global market and the second largest energy consumer the 
year before.  
With each passing year, Chinese society consumes more oil, natural gas, coal and elec-
tricity. However, the rise in energy consumption also has its negative side. Even though 
China has regions with abundant coal reserves, powerful rivers and strong winds, it lacks 
abundant deposits of the most important energy-generating fuel of all – crude oil. China is a 
significant producer of petroleum, but domestic reserves are simply not sufficient to satisfy 
its skyrocketing demand. This fact not only requires China to depend on imports, but has 
also induced Chinese leadership to embark on a global geopolitical crude oil hunt. Today, 
China competes directly with other powerful players such as the U.S., the EU, Japan and 
India in securing the flow of ‘black blood’, a commodity that is essential for any modern 
economy. 
China has pursued a strategy of establishing long-term energy security through in-
vestment in oil and gas fields abroad and through diversifying its supply network. Chinese 
national petroleum companies have had the most success by establishing operations in 
countries that have shaky relations with the West – Angola, Sudan, Myanmar and Iran 
being the most notable examples. Beijing has taken advantage of the fact that these crude 
oil-producing states are not the preferred partners for Western political elites. Owing to 
poor diplomatic relations, the West has often imposed sanctions on the respective gov-
ernments. Offering an alternative, Chinese petroleum companies have provided these 
states necessary financial and technological support. However, as the Chinese economy 
has continued to grow, the communist government seeks to further diversify its supplies; 
this has necessitated a penetration into traditionally Western supply markets such as Sau-
di Arabia and Libya. 
Securing and protecting vast amounts of petroleum imports is a geostrategic challenge 
with far-reaching consequences. First, China made the decision to establish a sizable pe-
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troleum storage infrastructure, referred to as the strategic petroleum reserves. This system 
is designed to provide emergency fuel capacity for several weeks. Second, present energy-
generating facilities require refurbishment, and new energy efficiency technologies need 
to be introduced. The main goal of these projects is not only to reduce energy consump-
tion, but also to allow the Chinese energy producers to capture and reuse significant 
amounts of energy that are currently being wasted. Third, Chinese national petroleum 
companies must utilize strategic mechanisms in order to locate, grant access to, and de-
velop oil fields around the globe. Great success in this area has been evident in Africa and 
Asia. Last but not least, in order to secure its maritime fleets for transporting oil, Beijing 
has been increasing its naval military capabilities and has started protecting crucial sea-
lanes and also building a network of deep-sea ports along the Indian Ocean. 
The Chinese appetite for energy could potentially result in two scenarios. Each of these 
will systematically be developed and examined in the course of this paper. The pessimistic 
scenario foresees energy-driven foreign policy placing China in a dangerous confronta-
tion with the U.S., Japan, the EU and India. American, Indian and Chinese navies are 
already competing across the Indian Ocean, with participants upgrading their naval forc-
es, building deep-sea ports, constructing military bases and forging alliances across the 
Indian Ocean. They have not yet entered into conflict, but as their naval presence increas-
es, the possibility of an armed clash grows. This scenario represents a ‘nightmare option’ 
that could have grave consequences for the entire globe, as the U.S., China, India and two 
EU members are all states armed with nuclear weapons. 
Conversely, an opposite scenario can be envisaged. A liberal integrationist perspective 
offers huge potential for multilateral energy security cooperation. Despite all tensions, 
China, the West and India are oil importers, and, as consumers, they could work together 
in fostering common strategies. What is more, their economies are mutually intertwined, 
and any conflict would bring about fatal collateral damage to the economic well-being of 
all parties. In short, China and America and potentially India could synchronize ap-
proaches to energy issues and address worries about growing global competition for 
crude oil. 
Being that as it may, China’s further integration into multilateral energy organizations 
– notably the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Inter-
national Energy Agency (IEA) – will not be an easy task. Introduction of the new stand-
ards and requirements could be a burden for Chinese economic development. Member-
ship in the IEA would reduce freedom in energy policy-making as it requires intelligence-
sharing, market liberalization and surrendering a certain degree of national sovereignty. 
Hinderances in integrating China into the IEA are a factor of the organization itself. 
The IEA’s efficiency depends on the willingness of its members to act and coordinate. The 
more coordinated and synchronized energy interests are, the more powerful the organiza-
tion becomes. This means that the Chinese energy policy agenda as well as those of the 
other IEA members should increasingly converge. Should this not materialize, any con-
flict would prevent this organization from acting efficiently. This occurs whenever a 
member country exercises its veto power; in order to reach decisions, IEA member states 
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must unanimously agree on decisions. As a consequence, prospective Chinese member-
ship into the IEA will imply a reform of the latter’s operating practices. 
In spite of the difficulties, China, the West and India would be better off using their 
power to foster common energy security rather than undermining one another. Instead of 
allowing tensions to rise, they could focus on designing an order that is legitimate, durable 
and in the interests of all. A stronger international energy security framework would reduce 
the enforcement costs of maintaining order due to institutionalization, and it could lock 
actors in favorable arrangements that persist beyond their power zenith. Working together 
and building mutual consensus on energy-related issues are, indeed, a greater challenge, but 
prove to be a better investment for the sake of international security. 
The process of China’s further integration into a multilateral energy system must be 
executed in phases that do not demand too much change in too little time nor lag behind 
the development of the conflict potential. Powerful parties need to have enough time to 
adjust their national policies, and simultaneously tackle the problems of rising global de-
mand for petroleum. Initially, China could be offered observer status in the IEA. This 
option would allow Beijing to participate in the organization’s emergency response exer-
cises. If the initial phases prove successful, more daring options could be envisaged. First-
ly, powerful countries could take crucial steps in depoliticizing the international oil mar-
ket. Reducing political manipulation would diminish the prospects for armed conflict. 
Secondly, the IEA could be thoroughly redesigned and made into a new organization that 
grants China unconditional membership. There are many hypothetical options on the 
table, but the most important message this paper wants to convey is that multilateral co-
operation is the only feasible strategy for preventing dangerous confrontation. 
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1.  Introduction 
Crude oil is still the most important energy source in the world. Petroleum has profound-
ly defined our economies and lifestyles since the time of Colonel Drake’s drilling adven-
tures in Titusville, Pennsylvania. This fact raises oil to the status of an extremely essential 
good, thus granting it high political saliency. It is the material that fuels our cars and 
trucks, heats our homes, allows fertilizers and pesticides to maintain the high productivity 
of modern agriculture, is the basis for plastics that have a multitude of uses in modern 
society, and has many other important uses in the twenty-first century. Oil is a common 
denominator in all economies: In order to exist and compete in the present-day world, 
crude oil is a primary requisite. 
Concurrently, both the price and global demand for crude oil are rising. The year 2013 
will represent a watershed for the international petroleum market as a majority of expert 
studies predict that oil consumption in the developing world will surpass oil consumption 
in the developed world (The Economist Intelligence Unit 2012). The main drivers of this 
trend are China, followed by India and Brazil. Meanwhile, almost two centuries of inten-
sive petroleum consumption have exhausted easily accessible oil reserves. Newly discov-
ered large oil fields are found in Arctic waters or in expensive to produce North American 
tar sands. In sum, these new trends will have a dramatic impact on energy prices and geo-
politics. 
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is the most populous and fastest-developing 
state in the world. In the last twenty years, the Chinese economy has grown at impressive 
double-digit rates and this trend does not appear to have any intention of stopping. Alt-
hough economic growth has slowed down and some fears exist about inflationary trends, 
the PRC became the world’s second largest economy in 2011, overtaking Japan for the 
first time in the modern era (BBC News 2011). The financial crisis in the U.S. and the EU 
has caused severe economic loss with America and Europe becoming poorer than they 
were five years ago. In contrast, China has emerged from the crisis with lower levels of 
public debt than any major Western economy.  
Needless to say, fast economic development does not come without a price. The Chi-
nese wirtschaftswunder poses many foreign policy challenges; the energy sector has been 
most intricately linked to security. Until the mid-1990s, the PRC satisfied 90% of its ener-
gy demand domestically (primary coal), but the PRC has lacked sufficient domestic petro-
leum reserves and is thus dependent on imports to satisfy demand (Dannreuther 2011: 
1345). Rapid economic growth requires a stable and abundant energy supply (Liu 2006: 
2), and politicians in Beijing are well aware of the challenge their country is facing. Ever 
since the mid-1990s, Chinese diplomacy has been actively working to improve relations 
with major oil-exporting countries, secure access to overseas energy hubs and control 
energy sources by investing in infrastructure projects. 
Nevertheless, this has not been an easy task up to now, and will likely not be in the fu-
ture either. The most important petroleum reserves that are easily accessible are located in 
the turbulent and volatile Middle East. Compounding this situation, Western and Indian 
navies patrol sea routes through which the majority of Chinese oil is transported (Pant 
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2012). Dependency on imported oil has motivated active Chinese involvement in conflict-
ridden regions in Africa, making it difficult for the PRC to follow its traditional non-
intervention principle.  
The PRC’s thirst for petroleum could result in two potential security scenarios. The 
pessimistic scenario predicts that energy-driven foreign policy will put China in a danger-
ous confrontation with the West and potentially India. The increasing Chinese presence 
in the Indian Ocean, Africa and the Middle East has raised strategic concerns in Washing-
ton, Brussels, New Delhi and Tokyo alike. The continuous growth in Chinese power has 
caused acute concerns not just among the U.S. and its allies, but also in Asia, most notably 
in India and Japan. The rivalry between the elephant and the dragon cannot merely be 
attributed to geographic considerations (Himalayan border dispute): though misguided, 
the power politics of the two states that compete on the global level could end in an armed 
clash, as was the case in 1962. Though the Indian economy may be growing at a slower rate, 
this global player is eager and willing to compete with China for international crude oil 
reserves (Chellaney 2010: 94-95). 
On the other hand, China’s rise could be interpreted in a more liberal integrationist 
perspective as offering the potential for multilateral energy security cooperation. This 
research paper argues for the second viewpoint; it examines a potential multilateral secu-
rity cooperation framework aimed at finding a peaceful solution for rising Chinese petro-
leum demand. The study wants to demonstrate that no matter how complex, time-
consuming and hard it may prove to establish stronger multilateral energy cooperation 
between China, India and the West, it remains a more effective solution compared to 
armed conflict as the ultimate method in dealing with the issues of diminishing reserves 
and rising consumption.  
First, the paper addresses the impact of rising crude oil demand on Beijing’s national 
energy security strategy, discusses Chinese options, and analyzes China’s foreign energy 
policy. Secondly, the paper presents prospects and challenges inherent in this phenome-
non in relation to the state of Chinese-Indian and Sino-Western relations, highlighting 
the risk of multiple naval rivalries and ensuing escalation risks. Finally, the paper propos-
es a multilateral mechanism that could be utilized to help the PRC attain energy security 
while, at the same time, avoiding confrontation with the West and vice versa. 
2.  China’s Crude Oil Challenge 
China has not always been dependent upon foreign petroleum supplies. Until the early 
1990s, China was a net oil exporter. A recent analysis estimates the country’s proven oil 
reserves to be at 20.4 billion barrels; currently domestic production is 4.5 million barrels 
per day with consumption at 9.2 million barrels per day (U.S. Energy Information Ad-
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ministration 2012a)1 Thus, current domestic consumption outweighs domestic crude 
production; import dependency has reached an alarming 52% of total consumption, mak-
ing the PRC the second largest net oil importer behind the U.S.  
Economic growth counts as the main driver of this phenomenon. As the domestic 
economy has developed, the average standard of living for Chinese citizens has increased 
accordingly. From 1985 to 2005, Chinese domestic oil demand doubled and this trend is 
expected to continue into the near future (Liu 2006: 3). According to the Chinese Acade-
my of Social Science, the dependency percentage is set to climb to 64% by 2020 (Wan 
2010). Some studies predict that this could even increase to 80% in the next two decades 
(Kennedy 2010/52: 138). At the moment, the majority of imported crude comes from the 
Middle East and Africa. The rise in oil consumption is widening the supply and demand 
gap, making China more and more dependent on imported crude.  
Several years ago, the United States Department of Energy predicted that Chinese oil 
imports would rise to 15% of international petroleum production by 2025 (Li 2011: 3). 
One indicator that supports the predictions of the U.S. Department of Energy is the sales 
figure for automobiles in China in 2011, which was greater than any other Western na-
tion, setting a historical precedent. While sales are dropping in the EU, Japan and Ameri-
ca, demand for vehicles in China will grow from 66 million in 2010 to 67 million by the 
end of 2012 (The Economist 2010b). The fact that the country imported more than 5 mil-
lion barrels of crude oil per day in 2011 indicates that China is immersed in mounting 
global competition and is exposed to volatile energy prices (Bloomberg News 2010). 
At the moment, China's rising energy demand necessitates crude oil, but coal remains 
the main source. The country’s economic growth is orientated towards the expansion of 
manufacturing and heavy industries; the energy demand of these sectors is met by coal. 
When combined with rapid growth in the transport sector – where energy demand is met 
by petroleum – collateral damage ensues on a grand scale. Economic development and 
growth in energy consumption cause increases in pollution and carbon emissions, engen-
dering negative externalities on ecological systems (Yanqing 2012/35: 411-412). Chinese 
rural and urban areas are already feeling the consequences: high air pollution during the 
2008 Beijing Summer Olympics caused troubles for athletes and organizers. As such, en-
vironmental issues make a strong argument for promoting non-carbon, green energy 
solutions for China. 
An important step towards reducing dependency on crude oil is the diversification of 
energy resources (mainly in renewable technologies and expansion of nuclear power  
 
 
1  There are less dramatic scenarios. If the non-peak oil assumptions are taken into consideration, the PRC 
should be able to precede with business as usual. Some analysts are predicting that areas like the frozen 
deepwater of the Arctic, heavy Canadian tar sands, and offshore pre-salt Brazilian reserves hide new Saudi 
Arabias that could be cost-efficiently extracted and refined with a near-minimum upgrade of current 
technologies. Although this is a scenario with detrimental environmental consequences, it will certainly 
calm global petroleum competition between the PRC and the West. Unfortunately, this is not a very real-
istic scenario. One could also argue that peak oil scenario would prevent the conflict because powers 
would not fight over empty oil fields. 
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generation) and development of untapped energy saving potentials in industry. Today, 
China is the largest producer of photovoltaic panels in the world with around two hun-
dred producers creating 1,700 megawatts of capacity in 2007 (Biello 2008). The decrease 
in Western solar technology subsidies coupled with falling international prices for the 
main component in photovoltaic panels, polysilicon, have allowed Chinese producers to 
overtake the West. Even though most locally produced photovoltaic panels are exported 
to the West, the Chinese government could increase domestic subsidies with the goal of 
developing domestic renewable energy capacities. This could lead to a high energy saving 
scenario. However, in order for this to become reality, the Chinese economy would need 
to reproduce the success of solar technology in other renewables such as wind, geother-
mal, and biomass; generation fluctuations and insufficient energy density do not allow 
photovoltaics to bridge this gap alone. This optimistic scenario would reduce Chinese 
dependence on petroleum imports, instantly leading to a decrease in pressure on the 
global oil market; this, however, would require heavy investment in the next few years. 
Investment policy in renewable and non-fossil fuel sectors has made progress recently, 
but policies are still not orientated towards wind, geothermal, or biomass. On the other 
hand, the government has invested heavily in the traditional renewable, hydro power, and 
in nuclear power plants. In early July 2012, the last gigantic turbine of the Three Gorges 
Dam was connected to the grid. This event marked the completion of one of the biggest 
and most powerful engineering project in the history of mankind. The total installed ca-
pacity of this multibillion-dollar project is 22.5 gigawatts and satisfies considerable do-
mestic electricity demand (The Guardian 2012). The Three Gorges Dam had significant 
consequences on the local population: almost two million people had to be relocated. 
Furthermore, the construction may increase the long-term risks of earthquakes and land-
slides. 
Currently, 40% or 27 of the nuclear reactors under construction worldwide are on 
Chinese soil (Bristow 2011). However, Beijing decided to halt the construction of a num-
ber of reactors in the aftermath of the Fukushima catastrophe, and this trend is likely to 
continue in the future. Presently, the PRC has 14 nuclear reactors that cover around 2% of 
electricity demand (World Nuclear Association 2012b). Further development of domestic 
nuclear capacity is under way; there are 25 more nuclear reactors in construction (World 
Nuclear Association 2012b). Prior to the Fukushima nuclear accident, the government 
claimed that it wanted to quadruple the total number of reactors in the decades to come 
(World Nuclear Association 2012a). 
From the Chinese perspective, self-sufficiency in energy does not come without a cost. 
Expanding the nuclear sector will reduce carbon dioxide emissions and diversify the en-
ergy mix. Nevertheless, despite generally high security standards, accidents may still occur 
and can have catastrophic long-term consequences if they do. Furthermore, the time 
frame needed for licensing, planning and building a new nuclear power plant takes at 
least a decade. China’s primary rationale in further developing the nuclear sector is the 
reduction of dependency on foreign imported crude oil. 
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3.  National Energy Strategy 
The Chinese leadership has drafted a number of strategic documents outlining policies 
vis-à-vis energy security. The ‘Twenty-First Century Oil Strategy’, adopted in 2003, allo-
cated more than US $100 billion to the development of a domestic strategic petroleum 
system (Cheng 2008/55: 301). It was soon followed by the ‘National Energy Strategy and 
Policy Report’ with the formation of the State Energy Leadership Group. The ‘Eleventh 
Five-Year Programme on National Economy and Social Development’ adopted by the 
Party Central Committee focused on energy conservation, energy efficiency and techno-
logical development.  
Maritime shipping moves almost 90% of the things we consume (food, consumer 
goods, energy resources, etc.). On account of its scale, maritime shipping takes up a spe-
cial position in the eyes of policy makers and military leaders in all powerful states. In 
order to establish secure crude oil supplies, countries expand their navies and invest in 
port infrastructure. China is doing just both of these things, as one of the goals of the na-
tional energy security strategy is to protect crucial sea-lanes. 
Running the second largest and the fastest-growing national economy in the world 
demands a multidimensional strategy towards crude oil imports. China is working on 
projects that will bring in this valuable resource from the Russian Federation and Central 
Asian states. The oil rich taigas of Western Siberia and dry steppes of Central Asia are 
closer to the Chinese market than the jungles of Venezuela or golden sands of Arabia. 
Penetration into these markets and the increase of crude oil imports from there would not 
only ease the tension with the West and India, it could significantly cut the cost of 
transport and relax the tension surrounding the Malacca Strait dilemma (see below). This 
would otherwise be an ideal solution if it did not lead to Beijing’s potentially serious de-
pendence on Moscow’s crude oil supply. China is working on the exact opposite strategy 
as they do not wish to become dependent on Russia. Thus, Beijing feels the need to diver-
sify imports or attain direct control of continental or offshore oil fields abroad. 
This is the reason why the National Energy Security Strategy is explicit in its concern 
regarding crude oil imports. The government has likewise tried to promote initiatives that 
could reduce domestic consumption and develop nationally owned alternatives. Even if 
one disregards the situation in which skyrocketing prices dominate global markets, Bei-
jing is aware that aggressive competition for resource dominance breeds economic and 
geostrategic risks. Energy security means security of both supply and demand. Even 
though Beijing is aware that it is not possible to attain complete petroleum self-
sufficiency, the policies it has developed center “on limiting the encroachment of foreign 
companies and dependence on external powers” (Dannreuther 2011/87: 1346). Unmis-
takably, the thinking of Chinese leadership on energy security shows a strong mercantilist 
undercurrent; this trend represents a common thinking pattern among all powerful states. 
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4.  Short-term Emergency Response: Strategic Petroleum Reserves 
An important step in safeguarding a country from a potential supply shock is the creation 
of strategic petroleum reserves. The concept was developed by the OECD’s IEA following 
the 1973 oil shock. The IEA was created in 1974 as a response of industrialized states to an 
energy crisis caused by a cut in oil production and selective embargo imposed by Arab oil 
producers in the course of the Yom Kippur War. The IEA’s system proved to be success-
ful in strengthening energy cooperation, hence, energy security among the OECD mem-
ber states was preserved during the war between Iran and Iraq, the Gulf War of 1991, and 
the Iraq war of 2003. In short, the Chinese system was built on the experiences of devel-
oped countries. 
Like many other non-members, China learned by observing the system created by the 
IEA. Beijing wanted to mimic the organizational and infrastructure system tailored by the 
OECD member states. China has been a member of the Asia-Pacific Economic Coopera-
tion (APEC) since 1991, but APEC’s Energy Working Group has had limited impact and 
does not compare to the influence of the IEA. Thus, the PRC has decided to develop a 
domestic system in order to coordinate emergency supply measures and to improve the 
governance of long-term energy issues. 
The first phase towards reaching this goal involved constructing strategic petroleum 
reserve bases; facilities in Zhenhai, Daishan, Huangdao and Xinkang have already been 
built and are operational. All of the terminals are situated along the coast and China pres-
ently does not possess an effective inland petroleum reserve infrastructure. The Chinese 
government plans to build eight more storage facilities in the next fifteen years. Should 
this come to fruition, China will have a capacity to store 374 million barrels (equivalent to 
38 days of reserves based on the 2012 national consumption rate) of crude oil (China Dai-
ly 2005). For the sake of comparison, American strategic petroleum reserves have the 
capacity to store 727 million barrels; an amount sufficient for 37 days of reserves based on 
the 2012 national consumption rate (U.S. Department of Energy 2012). Construction of 
the petroleum reserve capacity has been essential; without it, the PRC would only be able 
to satisfy only up to two weeks of domestic demand.  
In addition, the PRC has close to 200 million barrels of oil held by national companies 
(Cui 2012). So-called ‘double storage capability’ has been developed for two reasons: na-
tional defence purposes and commercial security. These security measures are the most 
efficient defence mechanism to protect China from the potential of a temporary oil crisis. 
Another crucial measure has been the creation of an effective fuel-switching capability. In 
case of a supply disruption, it is essential to have a number of reserve options that could 
offset a decrease in petroleum supply. A natural disaster in Russia or armed conflict in the 
Middle East could cause price levels to swell. Being heavily reliant on petroleum imports, 
the Chinese energy security mechanism must simultaneously have reserve and fuel 
switching capacities at its disposal. 
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5.  Long-term Options for Reducing Oil Demand 
Heavy industry has been the main driver in the rise of Chinese crude oil demand. Recent 
research shows heavy industries (e.g. cement, aluminium and steel production) account 
for 54% of energy use; only a few years ago, industrial energy consumption amounted to 
around 39% (Rosen/Houser 2007: 14). One solution would be the promotion of better 
industrial energy utilization. Energy efficiency strategies would not only reduce energy 
consumption, but they could also help China capture and reuse considerable amounts of 
energy that is currently being wasted. Waste heat recovery has proven successful in the 
metal and cement industries; heavy industries in Japan and Germany achieved great ener-
gy efficiency success upon implementation of these measures. If successfully applied, 
waste heat recovery systems could unlock a hidden energy potential by capturing, con-
verting, and reusing waste heat produced in heavy industry cycles.  
However, such measures would require major changes in Chinese energy manage-
ment. In 2008, an analysis of power plants in China by researchers from the Massachu-
setts Institute of Technology found that many energy-generating facilities operated with 
outdated energy technology and in the complete absence of related government regula-
tion (Chandler 2008). While many new power plants have been built in accordance with 
the highest technological standards, there remain many highly inefficient and aged units 
(Chandler 2008). Under these conditions, it is difficult to implement a nation-wide strate-
gy that would use a waste heat recovery system. 
Currently, China relies on abundant domestic coal supplies. Although suitable as a 
switch element in power generation, coal is not very practical for use in transport. Besides 
waste heat recovery, a second option is nuclear energy, which, again, is applicable for 
electricity generation, but not in a transport sector that relies on combustion engines. 
Coal and nuclear energy can be used for electricity production that could power railways, 
mass transit trains, public electric buses and trams. Furthermore, bicycles and coal-fired 
turbine ships do not require petroleum to operate. These efforts could very well reduce 
crude oil consumption, but could not completely offset the role of traditionally powered 
automobiles. 
6.  China’s Mercantilist Global Energy Strategy: Securing  
Overseas Resources 
Import dependency has made ‘oil diplomacy’ into an important aspect of Chinese foreign 
policy. In the last decade, the Chinese government instructed three major Chinese na-
tional oil companies (the China National Petroleum Corporation, the China Petroleum 
and Chemical Corporation and the China National Offshore Oil Company) to conquer 
international markets. This resulted in more than 200 projects in about 50 countries with 
an estimated value of more than US $80 billion (Kong 2010: 465).  
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China’s largest Gulf supplier is a long-standing American ally, Saudi Arabia. Being 
that the PRC did not, until recently, have strong historical or geopolitical linkages with 
the region, China decided to root its fossil fuel cooperation in strong trade relations. Bei-
jing created partnerships that define trade relations not solely based on petroleum supply. 
In return for petroleum imports, the Chinese are supplying goods and services to the 
Gulf. Nonetheless, at least in China’s point of view, petroleum represents the backbone of 
Sino-Gulf trade relations. 
In 1999, Chinese and Saudi high officials concluded a strategic partnership agreement 
whereby “Saudi Arabia agreed to open up select portions of its upstream market (exclud-
ing equity oil) to China, and China agreed to open up its refining and marketing sectors 
to the Saudis” (Lee/Shalmon 2007/49: 14). On the one hand, China needs access to abun-
dant Saudi crude and, on the other, having China as customer helps the Saudi oil industry 
diversify and reduce its dependence on the West. Aramco, a major Saudi state-owned 
national oil company, has built several large-scale refineries in China and continues to 
develop future business ventures in the PRC.  
Besides Saudi Arabia and Angola, Iran is the third largest petroleum supplier to China 
(Chazan/Blas 2012). The fact that China is developing strong ties with America’s number 
one ally as well as America’s number one enemy in the Persian Gulf raises considerable 
concern in Washington (see below). 
The second main area for Chinese oil diplomacy is Africa, notably Angola, Nigeria and 
Sudan (Ebel 2009: 50). After Angola, Sudan is the most important Chinese African petro-
leum supplier. Chinese trade with African countries – crude oil exports included – was 
based on a program that provides business consultation services and special funds man-
aged through the China-Africa Business Council. Most of the investment was directed 
towards oil exploration, extraction and transport.  
“Sudan was an oil importer before the Chinese firms arrived, and now earns some US 
$2 billion in oil export per year” (Fijałkowski 2011/29: 227). In 2011, South Sudan became 
an independent state, and, at the moment, oil revenues are divided 50-50. However, since 
China has warm relations with the Northern government, the South may decide to build 
stronger relations with the West. South Sudan completely depends on the North for infra-
structure and refining, but 80% of Sudanese oil reserves are located on their territory 
(Trivett 2011). Chinese companies have used the opportunity to engage with regimes that 
were sanctioned by the West: for example, Myanmar and North Sudan. They have been 
ready to invest and develop oil fields in the parts of Africa where European and American 
companies were reluctant to inject their Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) (Rotberg 2008: 
123-125). 
As of the beginning of 2011, Russia commenced oil shipments to China. At recent bi-
lateral meetings, the two governments talked about the construction of the Eastern Sibe-
ria-Pacific Ocean Pipeline, in addition to the currently operational Altai gas pipeline, and 
at least one border refinery. The joint effort will be financed by Chinese loans. Beijing has 
the intention of enhancing refining capacity from 10 million barrels per day to 13 million 
barrels per day by 2016 (Cutler 2011). 
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As China grows, international oil supplies are becoming scarcer, and the domestic 
economy is becoming tightly connected to oil price fluctuations in the international mar-
kets. Any disruptions that occur promise to have tremendous impact on national eco-
nomic operations. A higher price for crude oil increases the cost of manufacturing and 
hence raises the price of exports. Increasing the price of exports hurts the Chinese econ-
omy that has the comparative advantage of producing cheap export goods. For of this 
reason, the PRC might desire to wield stronger control over energy markets. 
7.  The Other Confrontation: Hopes for Fossil Fuel in the South 
Chinese Sea 
Apart from the Persian Gulf and potentially Africa, there exists a possible hot spot where 
energy considerations play a major role closer to Chinese shores. The South China Sea is 
one of the busiest shipping lanes in the world – including access to the crucial Malacca 
Strait, which is the gate for most of the Chinese seaborne oil supply. Before reaching the 
oil storage terminals and refineries alongside the eastern coast of China, close to 80% of 
oil imports must pass through the narrow passage of Malacca (Li 2011). Coastal states, 
including Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam, have vary-
ing levels of disputes with China in regards to various tiny islands. The Philippines, Vi-
etnam and China have been most active in claiming small pieces of land scattered across 
the South China Sea.  
These territorial disputes still remain unresolved. Tensions rose to alarming levels fol-
lowing speculation that the area may be rich in fossil fuels. The Spratly Islands, a group of 
more than 600 tiny islands located off the coast of Vietnam, are claimed by China as Chi-
nese territory. Several minor naval clashes with Vietnam and the Philippines have already 
occurred. Similar clashes mark the contestation over the Paracel Islands claimed by the 
Philippines and other neighboring states. Vietnamese, Chinese, Taiwanese and Philippine 
armed forces already occupy some of the islands (Cutler 2011).  
In addition to a crucial geographical position, the islands are rich fishing grounds. Ini-
tial surveys indicate that they may contain significant reserves of oil and natural gas. Es-
timates by geological research centers in local countries put the number at over 100 bil-
lion barrels; in 2000, a U.S. geological survey estimated reserves of 29 billion barrels (U.S. 
Geological Survey 2012). At the moment, tensions are present, but conflicts frozen and 
under control. What would happen if and when significant oil reserves are indeed proven 
remains to be seen? The U.S. position in Taiwan could have a significant impact in any 
dispute on the South Chinese Sea. It is probable that the U.S. would support countries like 
Vietnam, the Philippines and possibly Taiwan when it comes to their territorial claims 
there. It is in American interests to keep the PRC far away from the Malacca Strait. Ex-
tending Chinese rule on the Spratly Islands would not only provide the country with pos-
sible rich fossil fuel reserves, but would bring Chinese naval bases closer to Malacca.  
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8.  Controlling and Securing Vital Sea Lanes 
Controlling or having access to crude oil is important for two reasons. First, it provides a 
country with a steady supply of the resources that are the lifeblood of modern economic 
and industrial growth. Second, more control not only offers greater independence, but an 
opportunity to exert pressures on other rival states that are net oil importers.  
The Chinese strategy of securing crude oil supply might call for an increased military 
presence in the Middle East and Africa in the future; Beijing is already establishing its 
naval presence in the Indian Ocean. This is the first step necessary in order to secure stra-
tegic sea lanes. A more dangerous development would be if China were to establish a 
permanent military presence in the Persian Gulf or Africa. In either case, Beijing will do 
its best to obtain access to crude oil and, in so doing, will challenge the interests of other 
powerful countries, most notably the U.S. Also, the rising regional rival India will likely 
not sit by calmly while Beijing tightens its grip around the Indian coastline.  
Consequently, China’s foreign petroleum investment is being accompanied by the de-
velopment of its blue-water navy capability. Beijing desires naval forces capable of operat-
ing across the deep waters of open oceans so it is able to protect oil tankers traveling 
through the Indian Ocean and straits (like Hormuz, Bab-el-Mandeb and Malacca). Secur-
ing the energy supply is one central motivation in Chinese naval development (Kaplan 
2010). The Chinese government is building state-of-art naval ports in Pakistan, Myanmar, 
Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and the Seychelles (Kaplan 2010: 283). The Chinese navy gave 
these projects top priority, considering them essential for the protection of the main sea 
lanes across the Indian Ocean.  
Among all Indian Ocean naval facilities under construction, those in Myanmar and 
Pakistan are of greatest importance. Both states have land borders with China and the 
naval facility projects there are complemented by infrastructural (rail, airport, pipeline 
and highway) investment. If these ports and the additional transport infrastructure are 
completed in the future, China would be able to decrease the significance of the Strait of 
Malacca by transporting a portion of its crude oil via the Indus and Irrawaddy River val-
leys. The main function of Gwadar and Kyaukpyu (Myanmar) deep-water ports is to 
surmount the Malacca chokepoint. Additionally, the facilities will have the capacity to 
host both commercial and navy ships (Fisher 2008: 63). 
Myanmar and Pakistan do, however, both suffer from serious instabilities. Pakistan 
faces two main threats: spill over violence from Afghanistan and domestic internal ethnic 
instability (majority Sunni discrimination of minority Shia, and the Baloch question). 
Furthermore, Pakistan is controlled by a military intent on conflict with India and sup-
ported by a corrupt civilian elite (Hasnat 2011: 1). A weak state and acute socio-economic 
conditions fuel aggressive Islamic extremism, which is a widespread phenomenon across 
the country.  
Future Chinese investment in Pakistan could be jeopardized by several circumstances. 
Indian military facilities are just across the border and, in case of a confrontation, the port 
of Gwadar with its rail and pipeline infrastructure could be within reach of the Indian 
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navy, army, air force, and rockets. Pakistani radical Islamist or Afghani Taliban forces 
could attack Chinese operations in retaliation for Beijing’s oppression of Muslim Uyghurs 
in Xinjiang. Gwadar is located in the Pakistani province of Balochistan; local Balochs nev-
er accepted the dominance by Islamabad and are subject to constant discrimination 
(Siddiqi 2012: 52f). Lastly, on account of the poor infrastructure, the PRC would need to 
invest a good deal of funds to build necessary rail, pipeline and highway projects 
throughout one of the roughest terrains in the world.  
The infrastructure project in Myanmar has made better progress. The project is cen-
tred on the construction of twin petroleum-natural gas pipelines that will connect the 
port of Kyaukpyu to the Chinese city of Kunming. Besides being a pipeline corridor, 
companies from the PRC are developing vast oil and gas reserves as well as mineral de-
posits. Kyaukpyu may look more peaceful, but isolated Myanmar has its own troubles. 
Myanmar has been a country ruled by a heavy-handed military regime for several dec-
ades. Even though resistance in Myanmar is generally weak, active guerrilla resistance by 
other ethnic groups – most notably Shan and Karen – has challenged the majority ethnic 
Burman dominated military.  
At present, Myanmar is experiencing internal change: a political and economic reo-
pening has followed the cautious democratic process that started in 2011. The U.S. gov-
ernment has begun actively working towards a revitalization of relations, while India and 
the EU have been following similar patterns. The Burmese government is trying to reduce 
its dependence on China, and Chinese-funded projects such as the US $3.6 billion 
Myitsone dam and an 800 kilometer-long pipeline currently under construction are being 
highly criticized by the public and are losing governmental support (Reuters 2012). Chi-
nese presence in Myanmar has been linked to environmental degradation, land grabs, 
cronyism and corruption. Nevertheless, Myanmar will be hesitant in completely sacrific-
ing its friendship with powerful China in the course of its reforms. 
Realizing the problems they may face in Pakistan and Myanmar, the Chinese govern-
ment is aware of its continued dependence on passage through the Malacca Strait. The 
importance of this passage might be reduced with Gwadar and Kyaukpyu, yet most crude 
oil will continue to sail through the Indian Ocean via Malacca to China’s coast. With the 
intent of paving the way for heightened presence in the Indian Ocean in the future, the 
PRC is building four additional deep-water ports in the region: in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, 
the Seychelles and Kenya. 
Chinese government has invested US $1.5 billion to construct a state-of-the-art deep-
water port in the Sri Lankan city of Hambantota; now, Chinese companies are investing 
an additional US $500 million in the expansion of the port in the capital of Colombo 
(Xinhua 2012). Port Hambantota on the Southern tip of Sri Lanka is of massive propor-
tions and it is meant to become the central commerce port in the Indian Ocean.  
Also, China has upgraded ports in Chittagong (Bangladesh) and Lamu (Kenya). The 
PRC has made ambitious promises to the government in Dacca; Beijing plans to invest 
US$ 9 billion in the coming decades in order to develop “an ambitious new deep sea port 
further along the coast and a motorway running all the way to China – via neighbouring 
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Burma” (Devichand 2010). In Kenya, China plans to inject billions of dollars in building a 
second port near the coastal city of Lamu, followed by the construction of a rail and road 
corridor that will connect the coast with South Sudan and Ethiopia in the North. The 
project is supported by the South Sudanese, Kenyan and Ethiopian governments. All 
three, for varying commercial reasons, would like to have a modern port that would in-
crease the economic potential of the region. 
All these sites are along specific strategic locations in the Indian Ocean. By building 
these ports, China is trying to create an infrastructural network that will eventually grant 
it more control of, and access to, the energy shipping lanes in the Indian Ocean. The Chi-
nese leadership feels the need to increase both the military and commercial fleet presence 
in order to increase its energy security.  
Technically, there have been no clear indications of intentions to use the ports for 
military purposes. Nevertheless, that option is not off the table. Up to now, all constructed 
infrastructure has been designed solely for commercial purposes, but, in all of the coun-
tries in question, China has given the highest amount of military and economic aid with 
plans of linking these regimes closer with the government in Beijing (Kostecka 2010). 
The projects in Pakistan and Myanmar would diversify the transport of oil via land in 
order to decrease the number of tankers passing through Malacca. The diminishing sig-
nificance of the Strait of Malacca eases Chinese geopolitical fears in regards to energy 
transport. Ports in Sri Lanka, Kenya, Bangladesh and the Seychelles will help the Chinese 
navy increase the scope of its power projection.  
9.  Improvements in China’s Naval Capabilities: Recent Examples 
Taiwan still remains the main priority of Chinese military defence, and is significant for 
both offence and defence capacities (Fisher 2008: 169f). Nevertheless, the People’s Libera-
tion Army’s (PLA) leadership has other goals as well, such as projecting naval power ca-
pacity in the Western Pacific, modernizing the air force and developing anti-access/area 
denial capabilities. Military budget data show that “annual defence spending rose from 
over US$30 billion in 2000 to almost US$120 billion in 2010” (The Economist 2012). Even 
though this figure is almost four and a half times less than that of the U.S., it is clear that 
the PRC is expanding its armed forces. 
China is vigorously working on advancing military arsenals and improving the effec-
tiveness of its armed forces. The PLA has been developing two notable projects: Chengdu 
J-20 (fifth-generation stealth twin-engine fighter aircraft) and the refurbishment of ex-
Soviet Admiral Kuznetsov class aircraft carrier. In addition, the navy has made remarkable 
progress in the development of submarines and anti-ship missiles. In the long-run, the 
PLA is seeking to master the technologies necessary to produce high technology weapon-
ry and increase the scope of its power projection. “The PLA’s strategic priorities are grad-
ually shifting from defence of China’s borders to force projection within East Asia and 
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further afield, in order to secure sea lines of communication” (The Military Balance 
2012/112: 216). 
The Shenyang J-15 is a carrier-based fighter aircraft that is being developed by the 
Chinese navy. Although this aircraft does not present a groundbreaking achievement in 
military technology, it is a clear statement that China is determined to project its regional 
blue-water naval capacity. “The J-15’s initial role will be linked to, and limited by, its first 
operational platform: a ‘starter carrier’ to project a bit of power, confer prestige on a ris-
ing great power, and master basic procedures” (Collins/Erickson 2011). Another indica-
tion of the growing might of the PLA is the current development of the DF-21D. This is 
considered to be the first anti-ship ballistic missile with the range of 3,000 kilometers. DF-
21D is popularly referred to as an ‘aircraft carrier killer machine’; the weapon is specifical-
ly designed to target carrier groups, and is, thus, a weapon to contain the Americans. 
However, to date, DF-21D has not yet been publically tested (Kazianis 2012). 
Weaknesses do remain in China’s military posture. Aircraft carriers used by the PLA 
are acquisitions of aging Soviet ships that are currently being upgraded with Chinese 
technology, and Chengdu J-20 is presently a prototype undergoing operational tests. The 
Admiral Kuznetsov class is a conventionally powered test carrier with very limited attack 
capabilities due to the length of its flight deck. In sum, China is still in the process of 
learning. 
The Admiral Kuznetsov class serves as a learning-by-doing project for possible future 
Chinese-made and upgraded aircraft carriers. The Chinese navy needs to invest much 
more time and money in developing the capacity necessary to execute effective expedi-
tionary operations. Furthermore, the American military has several means at its disposal 
for reducing the effect of the DF-21D weapon: primarily electronic countermeasures and 
missile defence with the Standard Missile 3 system. The PRC’s navy will be able to protect 
ships carrying export goods and tankers destined for Chinese refineries; it could effective-
ly annihilate any threat coming from pirates and terrorists. Still, the ability to conduct 
serious modern naval operations is doubtful. 
10.  Indian, American and Japanese Responses to the Rise of the 
Chinese Navy 
10.1  India 
Modern Sino-Indian rivalry does not have its origins in energy-related issues. Post-1947 
border disputes have characterized bilateral tensions between the two. The most relevant 
episodes are: the Sino-Indian War of 1962, the Chola Incident in 1967, and the 1987 Sino-
Indian Skirmish. As China builds a network of ports to gain more control of vital petrole-
um transporting sea lanes, it is entering the Indian sphere of dominance. For this reason, 
the story will continue. 
14 Amar Causevic 
 
 
India imports most of its oil from the Middle East even though the country is working 
hard on diversifying supply. Middle Eastern oil remains cheapest in terms of geographic 
proximity and cost of transport. Indian Strategic Petroleum Reserves Limited has the 
capacity to store 5 million metric tons at three locations (Indian Strategic Petroleum Re-
serves Limited 2012). The country has invested a lot in the refining sector and plans to 
become an important global energy hub. For example, refining capacities developed in 
Jamnagar in Gujarat are the largest in the world. The Indian Ocean and its eastbound and 
westbound gates (Malacca and Hormuz straits) is an area of vital concern for Indian en-
ergy security. Securing this area and protecting vital sea lanes is of utmost importance to 
the military and political elites in New Delhi. 
The fear factor is not only persistent in New Delhi: Chinese party leaders are afraid of 
Indian growth and its ‘catching up with China’. On several occasions, both Indian Prime 
Minister Manmohan Singh and Chinese President Hu Jintao implied that their countries 
are friendly Asian neighbors; often the politicians are keen to emphasize the growth in 
trade from US $270 million in 1990 to over US $60 billion in 2010 (The Economist 
2010a). When public politics and media propaganda are left aside, the two giants are old 
rivals, emerging economies in competition, bad neighbours, nuclear powers and thirsty 
crude oil importers. What is more, they possess two of the largest armies on Earth with a 
combined total of four million troops. 
The two Asian giants have not entered into open conflict since 1962. The Sino-Indian 
War was ignited by unsolved border issues as an aftermath of British colonial heritage, 
and involved disagreement concerning demarcation lines in the Himalayas (Gupta 2008: 
29-30). The dispute has still not been solved. This has had an effect on India’s water secu-
rity, as several big rivers in north India, including the Brahmaputra, on which millions 
depend, have their springs in Tibet (The Economist 2010a). Beijing recently announced 
plans to construct a hydropower plant on the same river, which was interpreted as a direct 
provocation by the Indian government. In addition, Indian policy makers are concerned 
with China’s ‘grab’ for natural resources in Myanmar and in Africa. The African conti-
nent has special significance for Indian foreign policy not only due to the fact that a large 
Indian diaspora resides on the continent, but also on account of strong bilateral relations 
with many African states through the Non-Aligned Movement.  
Conversely, American-Indian friendship, especially cooperation in the nuclear sphere, 
is carefully monitored by China. As India feels encircled by the ‘String of Pearls’ – a term 
that refers to the network of Chinese infrastructure projects either existing or planned in 
the Indian Ocean – China does not feel comfortable with the American military campaign 
in nearby Afghanistan supported from U.S. military bases in Central Asia. Indian friend-
ship with the West extends to Japan as well. Recently, Japanese businessmen announced 
that they planned to invest US $10 billion in an economic zone situated between New 
Delhi and Mumbai. Furthermore, the Indian and Japanese navies also engage in coopera-
tion. In 2007, the Bay of Bengal witnessed a spectacular naval exercise in which Japanese 
warships trained with units of the Indian, Australian and Singaporean navies and two 
U.S. aircraft carrier groups (The Economist 2010a). Also, Indian and Western navies have 
paid friendly visits to the Omani port of Muscat and the Vietnamese port of Nha Trang. 
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Common Indian-Western military operations make Beijing feel uneasy not only because 
they surround China geographically, but likewise because they are carried out along the 
maritime lanes of the Indian Ocean, the Pacific Ocean and pipeline corridors of Central 
Asia. 
India is sceptically and carefully observing its Chinese neighbour. India has not forgot-
ten about the humiliation it suffered when Chairman Mao’s forces rapidly defeated Neh-
ru’s army in 1962. “India sees China as working to undermine it at every level: by pre-
empting it in securing supplies of the energy both must import; through manoeuvres to 
block a permanent seat for India on the United Nations Security Council; and, above all, 
through friendships with its smaller South Asian neighbours, notably Pakistan” (The 
Economist 2010c). The Indian Armed Forces had their fears revived in March 2012, when 
they found out that the PRC was considering building a military refuelling port on the 
Seychelles, adding one more pearl to its string. Strategic unease caused by the ‘String of 
Pearls’ is pushing India into a strategic alliance with the U.S.: Americans and Indians 
already signed a civil nuclear cooperation agreement in 2009 and have begun further mili-
tary cooperation. 
India has installed listening stations on Madagascar, the Seychelles and Mauritius. Be-
sides four naval ports (Mumbai, Karwar, Kochi and Visakhapatnam) on the coast of the 
subcontinent, there is one more port (Port Blair) located close to the coast of Myanmar 
on the Andaman Islands, which harbors the only joint forces command in the Indian 
military structure and supervises entry into the Malacca Strait.  
When China began working on Gwadar port, India developed a naval base in Karwar 
on its south-western coastline. In 2002, India helped Iran develop the port of Chabahar, 
just across the border from Gwadar. India intends to use this port in order to achieve 
more reliable access to Afghanistan, Central Asia, and be closer to the Strait of Hormuz. 
“India, Iran and Afghanistan have signed an agreement to give Indian goods, heading for 
Central Asia and Afghanistan, preferential treatment and tariff reductions at Chabahar” 
(Jaffrelot 2011). Behind the important economic façade that glorifies the importance of 
this project lays a stark strategic statement: India will not stand by while China extends its 
operations in the Indian Ocean. 
Nevertheless, as Chinese projects in Gwadar suffer from many problems, so do Indian 
endeavors in Iran. Chabahar is located in Iranian Balochistan, where local Sunni insur-
gent troops have launched numerous attacks against government troops. Secondly, con-
struction work has been behind schedule due to lack of necessary financial means. 
Additional Indian projects include the active development of a medium multi-role 
combat aircraft program. In addition, the Indian government is cooperating with Moscow 
to develop the BrahMos stealth supersonic cruise missile that can be launched from sub-
marines, ships, aircraft or land. This arsenal will extensively increase the strike capabilities 
of India’s armed forces. India currently operates one aircraft carrier. Alongside the INS 
Vikramaditya, the country plans to acquire two more carriers in the near future. India has 
also acquired a Boeing P-8I maritime patrol and anti-submarine warfare aircraft. In order 
to decrease the gap in its nuclear submarine fleet, India leased out its first nuclear-
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powered submarine, the INS Chakra, a Russian Akula II class attack submarine (ITAR-
TASS 2011). 
Indian military planning has been influenced by the continuous deterioration of the 
security situation in Pakistan and the rising power of China, with the second aspect defi-
nitely having a stronger geopolitical echo. While China is building deep-sea ports in the 
Indian Ocean, India is operating close to Chinese national waters. “The potential for fric-
tion between New Delhi and Beijing is shown by recent developments in the South China 
Sea, where India’s Oil and Natural Gas Corporation, working with Vietnam, is carrying 
out exploratory drilling” (The Military Balance 2012/112: 216). 
10.2  United States 
The U.S. currently considers China to be its biggest rival. The Chinese government criti-
cizes America for its development of military bases in Central Asia and for strengthening 
nuclear cooperation with India as well as for its strive for military superiority with missile 
defence. Nevertheless, China has an ambivalent position when it comes to the American 
engagement in Afghanistan. Strategists in Beijing are afraid that a rise of the Taliban fol-
lowing an American retreat from Afghanistan would have negative externalities in 
strengthening radical Uyghurs in Xinjiang. Moreover, Washington has repeatedly warned 
Chinese authorities against copying American intellectual property, for violating human 
rights and for breaking the rules of international trade. Energy is not the main focus of 
their tensions, but it is the one with a strong geopolitical component. 
As the world’s fossil fuel reserves diminish, there is much concern over a possible Si-
no-American collision scenario. Many security concerns have been raised in Washington 
regarding access to global petroleum reserves (Kemp 2010: 17f). The PRC’s Middle East-
ern and African petroleum incursions have incited fears among American political, mili-
tary and business elites. Recently, the expansion of Chinese petroleum investments in 
production rights, exploration rights, and pipeline construction in a large number of 
countries has been understood from the American perspective as an attempt by Beijing to 
hijack energy resources. In 2005, the Chinese National Offshore Oil Corporation almost 
bought the American petroleum producer Unocal before the U.S. Congress blocked the 
deal (The Economist 2005). The company was eventually sold for a lower price to Chev-
ron in order to prevent a potential rebid. 
The core idea behind the American petroleum security strategy is centred on two prin-
ciples (Duffield 2008: 214): The first is to reduce American dependence on foreign crude 
oil reserves. The second includes undercutting rival states from dominating the oil market 
and using petroleum as a strategic weapon against the U.S. (Moran/Russel 2008: 62-64). 
In the last couple of years, the U.S. has diversified petroleum imports by relying on Afri-
can supply. Also, the government has invested a lot in developing alternative sources of 
energy. Nonetheless, Americans are still far away from completing a robust strategy; the 
vulnerability of deliberate disruption of supply and the petroleum hunt of emerging peer 
competitors are key challenges for national energy security.  
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Nevertheless, IEA’s “World Energy Outlook 2012,” predicts that the U.S. may become 
energy exporter in the near future. Organization’s Executive Director Maria van der 
Hoeven stated: “North America is at the forefront of a sweeping transformation in oil and 
gas production that will affect all regions of the world, yet the potential also exists for a 
similarly transformative shift in global energy efficiency” (International Energy Agency 
2012e). According to this scenario, due to success in mastering shale gas exploitation 
America will become a net natural gas exporter. As a result domestic crude oil consump-
tion will decrease. But if this potential future trend can prevent Washington to discard 
any geopolitical interest in a secure crude oil supply for its partners and the global econ-
omy remains to be seen. Locations such as the Persian Gulf and South China Sea remain 
of high strategic importance for both U.S. and the PRC. 
Washington has been particularly critical of China’s relations with states such as My-
anmar, Sudan, and Iran, all of them being oil-rich countries which have been in interna-
tional disrepute and/or a hostile relationship with the West. Beijing justifies its relations 
with these regimes as a pursuit of the principle of non-interference in others’ internal 
affairs (Wu 2008: 267f). The United States has also repeatedly criticized the mercantilist 
aspects of China’s energy strategy. Beijing’s political leaders see energy security in terms 
of establishing national control over energy resources and transportation routes. Chinese 
authorities brush such criticism aside and describe their energy strategy as neutral. They 
emphasize that it is not their fault if Western enterprises and governments are either un-
willing or unable to invest in particular countries due to political reasons.  
On the other hand, China criticizes the West for its ‘neo-colonial’ modus operandi. 
Beijing believes that U.S. policies are crafted with the intention of hindering China’s de-
velopment and retaining American hegemony (Zhu 2010: 222). The Chinese government 
is especially sensitive on this issue due to the historical events that shaped Sino-Western 
Affairs. During the Opium Wars (1839-1842 and 1856-1860), British, French, American 
and Russian forces worked together in occupying important Chinese ports and imposing 
discriminatory trade conditions. Today, Chinese remember that period as the ‘century of 
humiliation’. 
The U.S. is working on counterbalancing Chinese trade and energy-driven naval ex-
pansion. In the last two decades, American fears of Chinese expansion – the ‘String of 
Pearl’s being a primary example – have caused Washington to increase its military foot-
print in Asia. China’s development of aircraft carriers, anti-ship missiles and cyber war-
fare capabilities are increasing the challenges to the U.S. Presumably, Washington is 
afraid that without retaining its military presence in the region, taking advantage of new 
partnerships, and technologies, Chinese power might seriously endanger its regional posi-
tion and threaten the security of its regional allies (Japan, South Korea and Taiwan).  
A significant step was taken in November 2011, when President Obama and Australi-
an Prime Minister Gillard announced U.S. plans “to deploy 2,500 Marines in Australia to 
shore up alliances in Asia”, a move that “prompted a sharp response from Beijing, which 
accused Mr. Obama of escalating military tensions in the region” (Calmes 2011). Several 
hundred troops came to Australia in April 2012, but the base will not be fully operational 
until 2017. Conversely, in April 2012, the U.S. agreed to redeploy 9,000 Marines from 
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Okinawa to Australia, Hawaii and Guam; all sites are located no great distance from Chi-
na (U.S. Department of State 2012a). 
The U.S. is vigorously working on further upgrading its military arsenal. Currently, it 
is the only country in the world that has started active production of the fifth generation 
jet fighter, the F-35 Lightning II. The X-51 hypersonic cruise missile is another powerful 
weapon in development; this unmanned scramjet’s main purpose is to travel at hyperson-
ic speed (600 miles in ten minutes) and destroy targets by kinetic energy with high accu-
racy (Shachtman 2006). It is crucial to note that at present, the X-51 is still under devel-
opment; the last test in August 2012 failed and, for the moment, there are no plans to 
include a conventional or nuclear warhead. 
10.3  Japan 
Post-2000 Sino-Japanese relations could be best described with the phrase ‘hot economics 
and cool politics’. China’s rise has posed new challenges to its eastern neighbour. Japan 
has become quite wary about the PRC’s military modernization, rapid economic growth, 
environmental impact and tremendous petroleum hunger (Rose 2010/22: 149). Rising 
Chinese demand for oil has a direct impact on Japanese energy security.  
Most Japanese oil comes from the Middle East, a region where the Chinese presence 
has significantly increased in the last decade. The potential threat from China was identi-
fied in the 2007 Japanese Defence Yearbook, highlighting that the fast development of 
China “could have a destabilizing effect on global energy markets and is a risk to [Japan’s] 
energy security” (Rose 2010/22: 162). Still, Japan is aware that the ultimate priority in 
Chinese military modernization is not orientated towards confrontation with Japan or 
energy security, but towards the issue of Taiwan’s national sovereignty. “For the time 
being, [the PRC] will probably aim to improve its military capabilities to prevent Taiwan’s 
independence and its military modernization” (Ministry of Defense, Japan 2012). 
Japan is highly developed, densely populated and suffers from a lack of natural re-
sources; a stable supply of crude oil is essential. Japanese petroleum import dependence is 
almost 100%, and 90% of the imported crude oil comes across the Indian Ocean from the 
Middle East (U.S. Energy Information Administration 2012b). The shortage of energy 
supply is a chronic problem for Japan; the country’s export-orientated economy is ex-
tremely vulnerable to any supply disruptions.  
As such, there are two main goals in the national energy security policy: enhancing the 
security and diversity of energy transportation routes and working closely with the IEA 
(Aso 2007). Rising demand for petroleum in China competes with high Japanese energy 
need. Both countries depend on the security of the same sea lanes for their energy imports 
from the Gulf. In order to protect its petroleum shipping routes, Japan primarily depends 
on the U.S. but is parallelly slowly modernizing and expanding its own navy. Since the 
end of the Second World War, Japanese leadership has developed strategies that avoid 
confrontation with China. They include fostering cooperation with Asian countries on 
developing an effective regional energy dialogue, cooperation in energy efficiency pro-
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grams and improving communication on energy within international bodies (Rose 
2010/22: 162).  
However, fear of China is even more acute in Japan than in the U.S. or the EU. The 
main reasons are historical legacy and geographical proximity. The Land of the Rising 
Sun felt pressure from Chinese economic and military growth years before they were dis-
cussed in Washington and Brussels. China is Japan’s neighbour; Beijing’s rise may pose 
symbolic and existential threats for Japan. A stronger China will demand more energy 
and could possibly develop military capacities for control of vital Japanese sea lanes. At 
present, the situation is being exacerbated by the fact that the Japanese economy has been 
in a state of stagnation since the 1990s and the country is dependent on U.S. Armed Forc-
es for its defence.  
From 1945 until today, the military capacities of Japan have developed in a limited 
manner under the auspices of the Americans; the armed forces of Japan are organized 
according to self-defence principles. The capabilities of Japan’s forces remain mainly de-
fensive. The post-1945 Japanese constitution prohibits national armed forces from pos-
sessing military hardware such as aircraft carriers, long-range surface-to-surface missiles, 
ballistic missiles, strategic bombers, marines, amphibious units, and large shared reserves 
of ammunition. 
The Senkaku Islands dispute with Beijing is an event that has raised fears in Tokyo even 
higher (Auslin 2012). Japanese defense planners now openly propose strengthening the 
protection of south-western maritime borders. But upon closer examination, the Senkaku 
Islands represent a minor part in the overall increase in Japanese defence spending. 
11.  Nightmare Scenario 
For the sake of understanding the true value of the multilateral energy cooperation initia-
tive, it is crucial to predict or try to imagine what a potential American-Chinese conflict 
would look like. Energy competition in the Middle East, followed by the expansion of the 
‘String of Pearls’ and an increase of American military in the region (Asia-Pacific), could 
be the basis for accumulating aggressive tendencies in both camps. A small military inci-
dent could spark a larger conflict, as in most wars. China could unilaterally occupy terri-
tory in the Paracel Islands to secure both local resources and sea lane control, provoking 
Vietnamese counteraction combined with efforts by nationalists. However, previous ten-
sions regarding Paracel Islands resulted in peaceful naval enounters and short-lived pub-
lic demonstrations only. 
Growing nationalism and strategic interests on both sides could weaken rational 
thinking. If an armed conflict arises, the U.S. would try to prevent China from achieving 
hegemony in the South Chinese Sea. 
In such a crisis, the U.S. might strengthen its naval presence as in the 1996 Taiwan cri-
sis. There would be the inherent risk that escalation might occur by accident or impru-
dent moves of local commanders. A similar confrontative scenario could emerge from 
20 Amar Causevic 
 
 
significant unrest in the Persian Gulf – say, a new revolution in Iran or even in Saudi Ara-
bia. With further developed naval capabilities, China might seek a stronger presence in 
the area to protect its regional interests while the U.S. would do the same. Again, the risk 
of unwanted escalation would rise significantly.  
12.  A Military Solution is not an Answer to China’s Energy Security 
There is no doubt that China is the pivotal nation-state in East Asia, influencing political 
and economic developments beyond its borders. It is also obvious that its military, includ-
ing naval, power is growing, absolutely and in relative terms, while the U.S. position of 
unchallenged supremacy is slowly on the decline.  
Despite these developments, the bottom line is that, currently and in the foreseeable 
future, China would stand no chance against the coalition it would face in case of a milita-
rization of an energy crisis, be it in the Persian Gulf, the Malacca Strait, or the South Chi-
nese Sea. The more aggressive the policies that China pursues in the neighborhood and 
on the high seas, the more it would provoke the formation of a (informal or formal) coun-
ter-alliance. This would include countries that generally prefer to keep a balanced and 
neutral position but who might chose protection as the lesser evil if China appeared all 
too threatening in the future. To stand up to such a counter-alliance, Chinese resources 
would not suffice, even under very generous assumptions. 
China maintains naval forces that comprise of the following units: 1 semi operational 
aircraft carrier, 13 cruisers/destroyers, 65 frigates, 5 nuclear-powered submarines, 3 ballis-
tic-missile nuclear-powered submarines, and 1 principal amphibious ship (The Military 
Balance 2012/112: 34). In contrast, the U.S. navy alone includes the following main naval 
combatants: 11 aircraft carriers, 83 cruisers/destroyers, 28 frigates, 57 nuclear-powered 
submarines, 14 ballistic-missile nuclear-powered submarines, and 29 principal amphibi-
ous ships (The Military Balance 2012/112: 34). 
The U.S. remains dominant in terms of active naval personnel and aircraft units. 
When compared to the American forces, their Chinese counterparts have less experience 
in open seas operations. Adding naval units from Japan, India, South Korea and Taiwan 
tremendously widens the gap. This alliance would seriously offset any capacities that Chi-
nese currently have and are planning to obtain in the short and medium-term future. And 
this does not account for the possibility that other NATO members, notably Britain, 
might support the US. 
Furthermore, Australia, with a middle-sized, highly experienced and capable navy, 
would also have to be counted in. In a conflict concerning the South Chinese Sea, the 
armed forces of major Association of Southeast Asian Nations countries would also most 
likely be involved, protecting their national security. The Chinese navy would have to 
operate more than 1000 miles from its own shores in waters surrounded by hostile na-
tions whose ports, airports and military facilities would probably be available to Allied 
forces. Also, China would have a problem in finding regional allies apart from Pakistan, 
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which does not have strong naval forces. The rusty North Korean navy operates mainly 
within the 50 kilometers exclusion zone. China maybe able to protect its commercial ves-
sels against pirates or a single hostile state, but it cannot effectively control the respective 
straits or extended areas on the high sea. Hence, this represents a powerful reason why 
China may consider cooperation as inevitable for the security of supply. 
13.  Incentives for Energy Cooperation 
The risk of the conflict cannot be ignored; however, it should also not be exaggerated. The 
‘String of Pearls’ demonstrates China’s growth and desire to protect maritime routes, on 
which 80% of Chinese crude oil is transported. China knows that dominance of the Ma-
lacca Strait would be practically impossible. For the moment, Beijing wants to increase its 
presence in the vicinity of the strait in order to increase capabilities for potential rapid 
response.  
The most important fact, however, is the impossibility for China to gain superiority 
over the overwhelming maritime coalition it would face in a serious crisis. This should 
induce additional prudence among an already fairly prudent leadership and lead the Chi-
nese government to look for cooperative alternatives. Fortunately, incentives for coopera-
tion are also found on the other side. 
Despite all tensions, both China and the West are oil importers. As such, they could 
work together in fostering common strategies, which, in turn, could produce benefits for 
both as supply or price crises would be detrimental to all. All importing countries must 
deal with individual producers or cartel organizations such as the Organization of Petro-
leum Exporting Countries (OPEC) that determine international fossil fuels prices. By 
working together, China and the West could wage more influence over the international 
oil market. 
Latest IEA report emphasized the idea that in the next decade the U.S. “is projected to 
become the largest global oil producer (overtaking Saudi Arabia until the mid-2020s) and 
starts to see the impact of new fuel-efficiency measures in transport” (International Ener-
gy Agency 2012f). Reduced American crude oil import dependency might ease the rela-
tions between Washington and Beijing, since increase in Chinese oil demand would be 
seen in less competitive and conflicting terms. 
As the two largest economies and energy consumers in the world, the U.S. and China 
could work on coordinating and cooperating in their energy needs. “There is also a con-
siderable logic to China’s favouring cooperation with other large oil-importing states, 
such as the U.S., Japan and the EU, rather than with oil-producing states, such as Russia, 
Iran or Venezuela, which tend to promote a revisionist anti-Western foreign policy” 
(Dannreuther 2011/87: 1350). The Chinese economic strategy is based on further integra-
tion into a global economy.  
Though energy security is of utmost importance, there are additional factors at stake. 
The U.S. and the PRC are economically interdependent. In 2011, mutual foreign trade 
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between the two powers amounted to almost US $504 billion (La Monica 2012). President 
Barack Obama and Premier Xi Jinping know all to well that deterioration in bilateral rela-
tions on account of crude oil would not be a productive option. China holds US $1.1 tril-
lion of the American debt, which, combined with the other bilateral trade connections, 
should clearly set economic considerations before the military reasoning (Harper 2011). 
The American economy needs to borrow money from China to retain the current level of 
domestic consumption. On the other hand, the bloodline of the PRC’s economy, which 
relies on exports, is the demand of American and European markets; the EU is the second 
largest export market for the PRC (European Commission 2012a). This interdependent 
relationship is fuelled by petroleum. In an energy conflict, China would lose its biggest 
export market and the U.S. would be left without a crucial external creditor. Any kind of 
conflict-related disturbance would hurt both economies at the same time, since both re-
quire crude oil to maintain their economic well-being.  
China’s dependence on the American domestic market for its current trade surplus 
means that Beijing will not provoke Washington into imposing protectionist measures as 
a consequence of political pressures within the U.S. Deterioration in trade relations could 
ultimately pose an even greater threat to China’s national interests than energy security 
concerns. The success of the PRC’s rise to a twenty-first century great power lies more in 
its economic than military might; it is critical that it is perceived as being a friendly trad-
ing partner rather than a military menace. 
The two governments started cooperation in the energy security sphere in 2004 in the 
form of the United States-China Energy Policy Dialogue. Furthermore, in 2008, the two 
countries launched the Energy and Environment Cooperation Framework with the goal 
of exchanging information and best practices between the two countries (U.S. Depart-
ment of State 2012b). Following the American example, the EU has entered into an ener-
gy-related bilateral initiative with the Chinese as well. Energy-related issues, such as pe-
troleum supply security, have been discussed in this context. The European Commission 
has been conducting an annual energy dialogue with the National Energy Administration 
of China since 2005; the dialogue is designed to strengthen constructive areas of coopera-
tion (European Commission 2012b). 
Relations between China and the West are characterized by both anxieties and will-
ingness for cooperation. Traditionally, relations have fluctuated between hopes and fears. 
Surely, the rise of China is a direct challenge to the West’s hegemony. However, Beijing 
has, until now, shown little aggressive behaviour; the Chinese have been more interested 
in economic cooperation than in flexing military muscle.  
The West sees an opportunity to integrate China into the world community. A power-
ful China is enthusiastic about the idea of being integrated into multilateral organizations 
which were originally Western-designed, but it will join only if Chinese power, values and 
interests are taken into consideration. The Western and Chinese economies are inter-
linked, and energy security of both entities is at the heart of their economic growth. A 
safer future lies in forming a consensus on mutual interests. Potential high-risk develop-
ments should be prevented. The best solution would be to act together in the framework 
of existing multilateral institutions. 
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14. Potential Chinese Membership in the IEA 
14.1 Advantages Outweigh Disadvantages 
When all is considered, it is clear that the best option is to make the Paris-based IEA the 
institutional site of energy cooperation between the West and China. Why is this the best 
alternative? First of all, though the Group of Twenty Finance Ministers and Central Bank 
Governors (G20) seems like a logical candidate, five of its members (Indonesia, Mexico, 
Saudi Arabia, Russia and Brazil) are major fossil fuel producing countries. They would 
block any consumer-driven initiatives in order to protect their domestic producer-driven 
interests. Second, the UN lacks competence in the energy field. Third, the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) – an international organization of great security importance 
– seeks to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy, but adding the oil component would 
significantly alter its nature and purpose. Fourth, organizations such as the World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund could hypothetically be included in the equation, but the re-
structuring necessary to emphasize an energy security component would demand gargantu-
an international effort and completely change the thrust of the organizations’ mission. 
India and China have established a partnership dialogue with the IEA, the aim to 
promote co-operation and dialogue in all aspects of energy policy and technology. “IEA 
cooperation with China and India would help in a number of ways, such as exchanges of 
information and expertise, improving transparency, identifying barriers to technology 
transfer, research and development, and wider policy cooperation on oil stock manage-
ment” (Jia 2008). Certainly having China and India as members would improve overall 
international energy security. The end result would stabilize the world energy market and 
oil prices through coordinated actions in adjusting oil stocks and exchanging key infor-
mation and technologies.  
Chinese officials have shown serious interest in building a relationship with the IEA. 
In 2009, they issued a joint statement in which they identified key priorities regarding 
petroleum supply and demand security (International Energy Agency 2009). Non-OECD 
states account for more than half of international energy consumption. India and China 
are going to become the major consumers by 2030. Petroleum demand by OECD member 
states is declining, while China and the rest of Asia are rapidly increasing their consump-
tion. On account of surging Chinese crude oil demand, the country requires not just suffi-
cient reserves, but a safe market as well. The IEA monitors the market and influences 
current and future oil prices as well as dealing with emergency oil supply reserves. By 
joining the IEA as a member, China would become more transparent and share critical oil 
market data, which is currently only partially published. In return, China would gain by 
taking part in the energy security dialogue and energy technologies development.  
Thus, the main option should be to integrate China into the IEA. Established in the af-
termath of the 1973 Oil Shock, the IEA coordinates energy policies among its member 
states with the aim of mitigating the effects of energy supply disruptions. The organiza-
tion has twenty-eight members, which hold emergency oil reserves equivalent to at least 
90 days of net oil imports of the previous year (International Energy Agency 2012c). The 
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IEA was initially made to manage disruptions of crude oil supply for the OECD countries. 
Additionally, it has been used as an information source on statistics about the interna-
tional petroleum market and as a monitoring center for other energy sectors. The organi-
zation has played a policy-advising role to its member states and developed a cooperative 
dialogue with important international players such as China, India and Russia. The core 
of all its operations concerns energy security, economic development, and environmental 
protection. Lastly, the IEA is actively working on campaigns that promote rational energy 
policies, development of renewable energy sources, and international energy technology 
cooperation. 
The IEA could serve as an ideal venue for the U.S., the EU, India, Japan and China to 
coordinate approaches to energy issues and address worries about growing global compe-
tition for crude oil. Integrating China into the IEA would have positive implications: 
technology transfer in crude oil exploration, extraction and production technologies 
could benefit Chinese environmental and energy efficiency, while energy use and partici-
pation in the joint oil emergency system might defuse the risk of a competitive contest 
during a supply crisis.  
Integration of China into the IEA would necessitate a modification of the 1974 
Agreement on the International Energy Program. During the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee hearing, Secretary Clinton implied that the American government would 
support such a move (The New York Times 2009).  
Although there have been initiatives to integrate China into the IEA, it cannot legally 
join at present as the country is not an OECD member state. OECD is an organization that 
represents a forum of countries committed to democracy and the market economy, espe-
cially concerned with economic, environmental, educational and scientific issues. Its mem-
ber states compare policy experience, seek answers to common problems, identify good 
practices, and co-ordinate domestic and international policies of its members (Jing 2008). 
China would most likely not easily surrender a certain degree of its national sovereign-
ty to an organization that necessitates democratic pluralism and human rights. Neverthe-
less, some bargain could be struck. If China were ever to decide to become part of the 
IEA, the OECD membership requirement in the organization founding charter could be 
dropped. In this manner, the West would show its willingness to accommodate Chinese 
needs and could use this concession as a bargaining chip.  
In the case of a major oil supply shock, being outside the IEA could potentially benefit 
China as free rider, should IEA member states be boycotted by petroleum exporting 
states. Under this condition, IEA member states would reduce oil imports and use their 
strategic reserves to satisfy their needs and inject extra crude quantities into the global oil 
market. China could benefit from a situation in which more oil was available on the in-
ternational market. However, the situation could be quite different if China alone were 
victim of an oil boycott; with the growing global influence of China, this could potentially 
happen. Finally, prospective membership would require China to bear some financial 
costs. Those costs would include rapid development of infrastructure: IEA members are 
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required to hold 90 days supply reserves of net petroleum imports, which both China and 
its regional rival India do not have at the moment. 
Potential Chinese membership in the IEA would also bring additional benefits. IEA 
membership would grant the PRC access to the energy technologies exchange program. 
Chinese international oil companies could gain advantages from stronger partnership 
with Western international oil companies. This option remains off the table at the mo-
ment due to lack of cooperation. Lastly, active participation in this multilateral body 
would help “reduce geopolitical risk for China’s effort to acquire energy supplies, energy 
technologies and energy investment opportunities abroad” (Kong 2011/2: 56). 
Operating outside the IEA leaves China isolated from the world’s most important oil 
consumer alliance, limiting China’s say in the international energy dialogue. As the largest 
future global petroleum consumer, Chinese membership in the IEA could be realized under 
three conditions: OECD membership or a waiver on the membership clause, the equivalent 
of 90 days of net oil imports and the liberalization of the internal petroleum market.  
Besides its main function of preventing and managing energy supply emergencies, the 
IEA has another extremely valuable operating mechanism. The organization is able to 
lend expertise to the development of policy and to share information among member 
states (International Energy Agency 2012d). This function focuses on the development of 
human capital and expertise within the member states, improving preparation in dealing 
with issues concerning energy security. Many member states have used this potential to 
develop and implement various national policies that improved energy efficiency.  
China could definitely benefit from this option, as there is much room for improvement 
in domestic energy policy. Moreover, the IEA provides annual reviews of national policies 
for its member states; within this process, IEA member state policy makers share their expe-
riences and define best practices. After such meetings, they inform their national govern-
ments, aiming to employ those experiences in domestic energy security strategies. This pro-
cedure could assist Chinese policy makers in achieving higher energy policy standards.  
The organization makes an effort to foster dialogue with petro states and other large 
energy consumers (the status that IEA retains with China at the moment). One of the 
initiatives that resulted from such cooperation is the Joint Oil Data Initiative. The main 
goal of this organization is to “assess the oil data situation in their respective member 
countries in order to better qualify and quantify the perceived lack of transparency” (Joint 
Oil Data Initiative 2012). The IEA succeeded in obtaining the cooperation of, among oth-
ers, OPEC and the UN for establishing a system that will improve information sharing 
and strengthen producer-consumer ties. One of the main topics discussed in the meetings 
is the future state of energy demand, definitely a topic of a great importance for the gov-
ernment in Beijing.  
14.2  A Step-by-step Approach 
Working on a slow transformation of the current Sino-Western energy partnership dialog 
with potential future integration of China into the IEA would be wise. The level of sys-
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tematic coordination could be improved by increasing the intensity of dialogue between 
China and the West. Intensifying cooperation would increase the level of trust. The agen-
cy’s Co-ordinated Emergency Response Measures (CERM) secures “a rapid and flexible 
system of response to actual or imminent oil supply disruptions” (Internationally Energy 
Agency 2012b). To be more exact, the organization conducts two different sorts of Emer-
gency Response Exercise (Exercise in Capitals and Disruption Simulation Exercise) every 
two years. These exercises are designed to help member states practice, test, and review 
emergency response policies and procedures to make them suitable for real-world crises.  
China could be encouraged to actively participate in this effort. In the past, there were 
some attempts to include Chinese participation, but due to reasons that remained publicly 
unknown they were not realized. The two camps must find a solution for including China 
into CERM. In the long run, Chinese participation in the CERM platform could improve 
monitoring, data gathering and communication between the parties. In the case of a seri-
ous disruption, both camps could much more easily coordinate reactions. The only prob-
lem of the less formalized relationship is the extent of IEA authority over China. Non-
membership does not allow the IEA to have a direct influence on China as it does on its 
member states, and vice versa. But even without a common legal mechanism binding 
these two sides, they could try developing some procedures for rapid consultation and 
coordination.  
In sum, there are two main advantages for integrating China into the IEA. The first is 
engaging China into the CERM. Having a country as large and important as China partic-
ipating in the CERM would lower the chances of petro states blackmailing consumers and 
would encourage the West and China to cooperate rather than fiercely compete if there 
were a disruption of supply. The second advantage would be the development of long-
term energy policy cooperation with a focus on mutual development of projects that 
promote energy saving technologies.  
The IEA and China should work with developers and the business community in these 
ventures in order to accelerate the deployment and commercialization of new energy 
saving and renewable energy technologies.  
15. Obstacles and Stumbling Blocks for Potential IEA Membership 
15.1  Sovereignty Sacrifice  
Promoting a stronger strategic partnership with the West would have tradeoffs for China. 
First, satisfying the IEA’s conditions regarding storage and energy efficiency could be a bur-
den for Chinese economic development as the country is not yet developed enough to fully 
comply with OECD standards. The secretariat does provide potential member states with 
the Accession Roadmap document, outlining a process that stipulates the steps that the 
candidate country must take and indicates the amount of resources required to cover the 
costs of the procedure. China would not have tremendous problems meeting the financial 
aspect. However, it does not yet satisfy all the benchmarks and standards at this point.  
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The bigger problem for the Chinese political elites would be that fact that becoming a 
member would include a partial loss of national freedom of action. Becoming a member 
of the IEA would cost China the benefits it has gained through bilateral petroleum import 
deals with the OPEC’s member states (McPherson/Wood/Robinson 2004: 205f). Mem-
bership requires intelligence sharing, market liberalization and surrender of a certain 
degree of national sovereignty. China has opened up extensively since the death of 
Chairman Mao, but the Communist Party is still reluctant when it comes to political co-
operation.  
Another problem is contained in the structure of the domestic energy market in Chi-
na, i.e. the tight control that the government exerts over oil companies. Many foreign 
companies have been permitted access to the Chinese market; however, their participa-
tion has remained restricted. They have only been allowed in the fields for which foreign 
technologies and skills are absolutely necessary (Andrews-Speed 292). Foreign investment 
in China’s downstream sector has been restricted and subject to various legal constraints. 
With potential IEA membership, the domestic Chinese petroleum distribution and pro-
duction sector would be required to undergo substantial transformation. At this point, 
Beijing is not ready to renounce control of the state-controlled pricing system for oil 
products. However, the Chinese state would have an opportunity to retain some degree of 
control over its energy economy. IEA member states, such as U.S. and France, have done 
so in the past. The U.S. was able to keep gas prices under its own control for years and the 
French government has been playing a crucial role in the development and monitoring of 
domestic energy sector.  
Potential membership would increase the pressure on China to take on more respon-
sibilities. Presently, the greatest major limitation to potential Sino-Western multilateral 
energy cooperation is the readiness of the Chinese government and national oil corpora-
tions to pursue relations with the countries which are stigmatized by the West: Venezuela, 
Iran and Sudan being the best examples. However, IEA membership does not preclude 
such relations.  
Beijing considers itself to be so called ‘late entrant’ into the international energy mar-
kets, which were historically controlled and exploited by the Western-based international 
oil companies. The comparative advantage of Chinese national oil companies lies in states 
where access to energy resources incurs significant political or economic risk (Falola/ 
Genova 2005: 85). Nonetheless, strengthening cooperation with the West would not 
please leaders of the states that have tense diplomatic relations with the West. However, 
their relations with China would, for all intents and purposes, not be endangered either. 
Profits generated by the huge Chinese markets would overshadow other risks. 
15.2  Present Organizational Structure of the IEA 
The problem of integrating the PRC lies within the IEA organization itself. The structure 
of global crude oil markets has evolved since the time when the organization was formed. 
In 1974, the major oil net import nations were OECD member states. Today, they are 
being challenged by India and China. The size and shape of new emerging economies 
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may make the IEA’s mission more difficult under present circumstances. If a potential 
supply shock occurred, the IEA would have much more limited capacity to coordinate 
collective action than it did three decades ago as long as the new big consumers are not 
sitting at the table. Should a supply shortfall prove very serious, the organization would 
have to decide how much of the member states’ strategic reserves should be brought on 
the market. This authority made the IEA more powerful in the past when the Western 
states had a larger share in the global economy and energy consumption. Taking China 
(and consequently India) in as members would help. 
Effectiveness of the IEA depends on the willingness of its members to act and coordi-
nate. Since an equal distribution and mitigation of an oil shortfall would serve as a com-
mon good, such willingness might be available. If a committed China (and India) worked 
with the U.S., the EU, and Japan, the IEA could endure challenges of a global scale. 
Former U.S. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton stated that the IEA could benefit from 
potential Indian and/or Chinese membership (Alexandroff/Cooper 2010: 260). But India 
and China will not enter the organization as second tier members; they wish to have more 
influence in the decision-making processes. Routine decision-making in the IEA follows 
the consensus rule. In crises, on the other hand, the decision-making mechanism works 
on an outdated voting system; each member state is given three votes plus a number of 
votes based on their 1973 net oil imports (International Energy Agency 2012a). Energy 
consumption patterns have, however, changed over time.  
There have been initiatives put forth to update the voting system, but some member 
states that were in a dominant position in mid 1970s – and are not in a similar position 
today –opposed them. Since powerful states benefit from the system in place, the initiative 
of updating the voting structure has never gained serious momentum. The voting system 
issue is one of the facts that create reservations against Chinese accession among present 
IEA member states: if the PRC (and India) became members, the voting structure would 
experience radical transformation. Post-Cold War members (mainly Eastern European 
states) have not insisted on serious Governing Board restructuring, but the same cannot 
be expected in the case of potential Indian or Chinese membership. Countries of that rank 
would surely insist on thorough restructuring, which would significantly dilute the role of 
many existing members. But this adaptation is the price for a more inclusive and thus 
more reliable system of promoting energy security for all. 
Building a stronger, fairer and impartial multilateral energy organization would pro-
vide all actors with necessary energy security guarantees. Expanding and potentially re-
forming the IEA is necessary for developing a legitimate political energy security order in 
which members willingly participate and agree with the overall orientation of the system. 
A stronger international energy security framework would reduce the enforcement cost of 
maintaining the order on account of its institutionalization, and it might lock actors in 
favorable arrangements that persist beyond their power zenith. The choice exists between 
using power capabilities for immediate gains and investing in institutions that extend 
expected benefits into the future: Rules and institutions are simply more productive than 
conflict (Keohane 2005: 246). 
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16. Conclusions and Recommendations 
Globally, there are worries that the rise of China (and India) will disturb existing energy 
relationships and regimes. Cooperation in the global political economy is very difficult to 
organize, but non-hegemonic cooperation is possible and can be facilitated by interna-
tional regimes (Keohane 2005: 83f). The most transparent solution in dealing with future 
rising petroleum demand in China (and India) and the security of supply in the West 
would be through a multilateral organization such as the IEA. A multilateral body of this 
kind could encourage intergovernmental cooperation; the West and China would have 
the opportunity to draft joint policies and act as partners in the realization of petroleum 
security objectives. Multilateral cooperation through the international organization would 
facilitate trust; states feel more secure in this kind of environment (Ikenberry 2008: 58f). 
The geopolitics of oil includes a strong military element. Armed forces can either be 
viewed as a mechanism for destruction or as a tool for cooperation. Military cooperation, 
especially the naval component, is already taking place in a limited way. In 1998, the 
American and Chinese governments signed the Military Maritime Consultative Agree-
ment (marking the beginning of consultations on military maritime issues); China also 
has similar agreements with Vietnam, South Korea and Japan (Xinhua 2011). 
The first deployment of the PRC’s battle-ready naval unit was to the Gulf of Aden in 
2008 (McDonald 2008). This fleet’s top priority was to protect merchant ships, especially 
tankers transporting crude oil, from Sudan to mainland China. The Chinese navy used 
the opportunity to communicate and cooperate with warships of other countries in per-
forming humanitarian rescue tasks. The American government welcomed the initiative as 
it allowed the US to exercise more control over China. Conversely, the PRC’s navy used 
the opportunity to observe and learn from the NATO warships operating on the high 
seas. In September 2010, the Royal Australian Navy Frigate HMAS Warramunga con-
ducted a joint live firing exercise with the Chinese navy off the Chinese cost (Royal Aus-
tralian Navy 2010). Australia is not the EU, Japan, or the U.S., yet it is a very important 
American ally. Progress is on the horizon, and Western and Chinese militaries can, and 
should, cooperate.  
China and the West should develop initiatives such as agreement on joint sea-lane pa-
trol. In this way, energy transporting routes would not only be protected, but all sides 
could strengthen military cooperation. Patrolling could improve mutual trust as navies 
would be in constant contact and would need to work together on a daily basis. Finally, 
common naval patrolling can be understood as a mechanism that can divide labor re-
quirements – having more participants saves resources.  
When it comes to Sino-Indian bilateral relations, on the other hand, there are reasons 
for concern. However, neither country is ready or willing to enter into an armed conflict. At 
the moment, China and India are more interested in global commercial affairs than in 
armed deterrence. Nevertheless, as they flex their economic muscles, their developing econ-
omies will require more crude oil. In combination with unresolved border issues the Indian 
Ocean, rivalry could result in an armed clash. With the development of good Indian-
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American relations, the US might be in a position to entice India into joint patrolling as 
well. 
Chinese and Western attitudes towards one another are still characterized by a lack of 
mutual trust. On the other hand, both are facing the same problem of being net petrole-
um importers. Fortunately, there are some positive signals on both sides: China has an 
open cooperation dialogue with the IEA. The Chinese political leadership demonstrated 
the country’s desire to present an image of a responsible rising power to the international 
community. Hence, we could hope that China will tend to play a more constructive role 
in global energy governance. The gravest stumbling blocks for progress are internal con-
straints in attitudes of the ruling regime, regulation of domestic oil market and strategic 
reserve capacities. Also, in order to take a further step ahead, Beijing requires more coop-
eration from the West. This includes, for example, avoidance in condemning the Chinese 
principle of non-interference in domestic affairs when it deals with petro states on a bilat-
eral basis. Given the country’s need to retain crude oil supply security, China will almost 
certainly contribute to enhancing the initiative for peaceful cooperation rather than mili-
tary confrontation.  
An integration of China into the IEA should happen in various phases and would in-
volve compromises on both sides. The Chinese authorities need to become more trans-
parent. Authorities in Beijing should allow the IEA to check the validity of information 
they are present with. Before any serious membership initiative, the IEA and China would 
need to raise their level of coordination. Coordination could be extended from the trans-
parent exchange of data to building adequate communication and monitoring systems. 
The organization should invite China to participate as an observer in the emergency re-
sponse exercises. These initiatives would reinforce cooperation on issues such as common 
response on serious supply disruptions. 
The IEA is the most important energy consumer organization in the world, and China 
will become the biggest crude oil consumer in the next two decades. Ignoring each other 
would not be a smart option; on the contrary, it could have negative consequences at the 
global level. Potential decrease in future American crude oil demand might be a trend that 
will enhance mutual cooperation. In that case foreign imported oil will have less econom-
ic and political importance for the U.S. making cooperation over the same resource easier. 
Hence, China could be invited to attend IEA working group sessions as an observer. 
Attending the working group meetings would give China an opportunity to actively par-
ticipate in the IEA system, to become acquainted with its procedures and to learn the 
degree to which this cooperation accords with its own security interests in more detail. 
Such participation could be used to discuss another promising option with Beijing: 
depoliticizing the oil market. Inevitably, this move would relax political influence and 
control over the petroleum business. The process of depolitization would go a long way in 
preventing the clash between China and the West. The key would be to allow cross-
investment in all oil companies, to create a system of mixed ownership, and to reduce 
governmental interference with the companies’ commercial decisions.  
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More radical recommendations could take a total refurbishment of the IEA into con-
sideration and the organization could be entirely restructured. The new hybrid multilat-
eral body could be a mix of the IEA member states, China and potentially India. The IEA 
was established on the lessons learned from 1973 Oil Shock; hence, the new global multi-
lateral energy organization can be designed alongside the energy challenges humanity 
faces today. In the end, everything depends on the willingness of China and the IEA 
member states to join forces. Integration of China and India into the IEA represents a 
solid incentive to reform the agency with a goal of creating a multilateral body that would 
serve as a platform on which crude oil consumers can settle their differences. The situa-
tion as it stands today is not productive. Any future arrangement would require some 
sacrifices in the short-run, but these would be aimed at producing common long-term 
benefits.  
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